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The Three Parts of this Tutorial
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A Single-Agent Sequential Decision Problem
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Representation and Strategies in a Sequential Game
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Non-Credible Threats
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Sub-Game Perfect Equilibria
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The Centipede Game
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Cooperation in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
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Framing Bias
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Ultimatum Game
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The Level-k Model
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Level-k in the Beauty Contest Game
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Solving Static Games with Gambit
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Solving Dynamic Games with Gambit
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7.2 Level-k in the Beauty Contest Game » Quiz Solution
Lesson 8 : In the game below, suppose that the level-0 strategy for player 1 is to play C and the level-0
strategy for the player 2 is to play S. Will players of the same level ever play the same strategy?
(a) Yes
(b) No
Explanation: Player 1's level-k strategy is to play S when k is odd, and C when k is even.
The opposite is true for player 2.