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The Three Parts of this Tutorial
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A Single-Agent Sequential Decision Problem
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Representation and Strategies in a Sequential Game
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Non-Credible Threats
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Sub-Game Perfect Equilibria
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The Centipede Game
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Cooperation in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
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Framing Bias
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Ultimatum Game
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The Level-k Model
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Level-k in the Beauty Contest Game
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Solving Static Games with Gambit
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Solving Dynamic Games with Gambit
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4.1 The Centipede Game » Quiz Solution
Lesson 4 : True or False. In the game below, it is a subgame perfect equilibrium to for player 1 to play "Stop" in the first round?
(a) True
(b) False
Explanation: Unlike the centipede game in the video, player 2 would play "Continue" if they had the chance to act a second time. Knowing this, player 1 would not play stop in the first stage.